economies, as well as the differences in the dimension of economic management system and institutions between Vietnam and China.
I like to add one additional remark concerning the recent political situation in Vietnam discussed in section 2 of Sakata (2020) . As Sakata mentions, it is true that in October 2018, Party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong held concurrently the position of President (Head of State), after the sudden death of President Tran Dai Quang. Quite a few foreign observers argued that Trong's double role as president and party head together with his initiative in leading vigorous anti-corruption campaigns would intensify his political power, and they even compared his style of government with that of China's strongman, Xi Jinping.
But in April 2019, Trọng suddenly suffered a brain infarction while visiting a southern province. He was then hospitalized and disappeared from the public scene for a few weeks. One month later, Trong made a comeback, but his activities have been less visible in the local mass media than previously.
At any rate, foreign observers recently anticipate that Trong who is now 75 years old 1 will retire at the next party congress to be held in early 2021, and that the next party chief will not take on the double role. As such, the Vietnamese Communist Party's principle of collective leadership will be unchanged.
The tradition of collective leadership in Vietnam is one of the most important factors which differ from the case of China. This difference stems not only from the personal attributes of the present leadership, but also the long tradition of political culture and the legacy of Ho Chi Minh's style of leadership.
Note 1 Trong was reelected as Secretary General at the last party congress held in January 2016 even though he was already 71 years old, and there was a party policy of political bureau's retirement age of 65 (in principle).
